Abstract In light of events at the Daiichi nuclear plant, this article discusses the origins of nuclear power in Japan. These origins lie in a confluence of forces: strategic, economic, and cultural. Drawing inspiration from the work of Antonio Gramsci, the article considers the operation of these forces through a historical lens, with an emphasis on Japan's transition from feudalism to capitalism; the emergence of imperialism and ultranationalism; the postsurrender occupation of Japan by the United States; and the post-Occupation debate over nuclear power. Gramscian analysis highlights key roles of both the state and civil society in the promotion of science and technology as a tool of economic growth and as a symbol of national autonomy. The article suggests that, despite the Fukushima tragedy, Japan will continue to develop its nuclear industry for many years to come. This is the case not only because of ongoing strategic concerns and the power of the "nuclear village" but also because the ideology of techno-nationalism is deeply ingrained within and throughout Japanese society.
announced since the disaster, as late as June 2010 the strategic energy plan of Japan called for the building of fourteen additional nuclear plants by 2030 (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2010) . The February 2014 election of Masuzoe Yōichi as Tokyo mayor ahead of two antinuclear candidates indicated a weakening of antinuclear sentiment, possibly due to the trade deficit, which doubled between 2012 and 2013. Despite public hostility in the wake of the disaster, the publication of the latest Strategic Energy Plan in April 2014 confirmed that nuclear power will continue to feature in Japan's energy mix for many years to come (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2014).
Underpinning these discussions are a number of concerns, none of which can be lightly set aside. Japan is only 16 percent self-sufficient in energy, and oil provides 46 percent of its primary energy needs. The Middle East supplies 77 percent of this oil. Cheap oil is a thing of the past, but reliability of supply remains a key issue for Japan. 2 In this context, the sense of vulnerability that has shaped the worldview of Japanese governments throughout the modern era can only have been sharpened following the Arab Spring. Some of the consequences of the Arab Spring have been the fall of the regime in Libya, ongoing unrest in Egypt, civil war in Syria, and the declaration of a "caliphate" embracing parts of Syria and Iraq. In addition, there is continuing concern surrounding Iran's nuclear program and the Arab-Israel dispute.
With all of Japan's nuclear reactors shut down for maintenance and safety checks, the trade balance has suffered-showing a deficit for the first time in thirty-one years in 2011. With their energy bills climbing ever higher, members of the business community have begun to mutter about moving abroad where costs are lower. The Japanese government is, accordingly, desperate to restart those few reactors that have successfully passed safety and stress tests. However, the local governments empowered to permit reactivation of these power plants anticipate a backlash from local constituents, and a great deal of foot dragging has been the result. If the central government asserts its prerogative to bring these plants back on line regardless of local concerns, it opens itself up to punishment at the national polls.
A further concern is that the development of nuclear power is a prime example of the high-technology, high-value-added export-oriented industry so important to the continued success of a mature economy such as Japan's. Moreover, the Japanese government has committed the country to reducing its carbon footprint in line with the Kyoto Protocol and other environmental agreements, and nuclear power is seen as contributing toward this goal (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2014). Finally, Japan confronts three nuclear-armed powers in its immediate neighborhood: China has aspirations toward regional leadership, and relations with both Russia and China have been soured by long-running territorial disputes (Connors, Davison, and Dosch 2012) . North Korea is at once fragile and openly aggressive, and perceptions of its instability have heightened following the death of Kim Jong-il. Increased military preparedness throughout Northeast Asia has been the result. Given concern over the US commitment to defend Japan in the event of an attack-particularly a nuclear attack-the Japanese government will almost certainly want to retain the option to develop nuclear weapons in the future. Indeed, a growing body of literature attests to a Japan that is becoming more "normal" in its attitude toward the possession and use of military power as a legitimate tool of foreign policy (Oros 2008; Taylor 2011) . Recent efforts by the Japanese government to reform Japan's constitution to allow a more active military role appear to confirm these analyses.
In light of events at Fukushima, this article assesses the potential demise of nuclear power in Japan by examining its origins, from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective. From an empirical perspective, exploring the origins of nuclear power in Japan can shed light on the difficulties associated with the promised dismantling of the nuclear industry. A host of powerful interests, both within (the "nuclear village") and beyond the country, will fight to secure a nuclear future for Japan. 3 These interests will be military, bureaucratic, political, and commercial. They will deploy financial, technical, and "moral" arguments in support of their cause. Just as it was sixty or so years ago, the immediate focus will be on Japan's much bemoaned "vulnerability": to military attack, to the vicissitudes of natural resource dependence, and to economic slowdown and decline in the face of energy scarcity. This narrow focus on vulnerability will act as a proxy for a wider discussion about-and struggle over-the type of society in which Japanese people want to live, in other words, over Japan's collective identity.
From a theoretical perspective, in the context of East Asia, the field of science, technology, and society studies (STS) is awash with interesting and fruitful theoretical approaches and conceptual frames (Mizuno 2012) . This variety of intellectual endeavor is no bad thing, according to a recent commentator, who likens the field to "an elephant whose shape we are trying to determine by touching it in the dark" (Fan 2012: 487) . This article attempts to run an additional pair of hands over the elephant by developing an empirical account of the introduction of nuclear power into Japan inspired by the work of Antonio Gramsci. A Marxist intellectual of the first order, Gramsci is renowned for his exploration of the "superstructure" of the capitalist mode of production: the milieu of politics, religion, science, and culture. There is good reason to argue that Gramsci's work can be used to develop an account of the introduction of nuclear power into Japan that complements and extends existing narratives of that process. In particular, a Gramscian analysis demonstrates key roles of both the state and civil society in the promotion of science, both as a tool of economic growth and as a symbol of national autonomy. In so doing, this retelling of a familiar tale can add value to (East Asian) STS as a field of intellectual inquiry and also provide one response to a recent call for help in untangling "the complex situation in which the Japanese now find themselves" (Fujigaki and Tsukahara 2011: 393) .
The article opens with a brief rehearsal of those elements of Gramscian historical materialism central to the empirical study conducted in this article. The remainder of the article examines the historical narrative, comprising the development of the ideology of techno-nationalism during the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji; the "domestic" political economy of nuclear power, including the social struggle that attended nuclearization; and the decisive propaganda campaign that successfully spun the "friendly atom."
Gramsci's Historical Materialism
Gramsci's Prison Notebooks (1971) contains only three brief and tangential references to Japan: one in a discussion of the role of intellectuals in society, and the other two in the passages on "Americanism and Fordism." Nevertheless, the range of socioeconomic and political similarities between Italy and Japan-not least their "historical backwardness" relative to the major Western powers-not only makes comparative analysis of their respective trajectories potentially rewarding but also suggests the suitability of conducting a Gramscian analysis of the Japanese experience (on the former, see Samuels 2003) . The Japanese case, as well as other, later examples, highlights the key roles of science and technology in the struggle for emancipation from imperial control. 4 In the absence of a strong scientific and technological base, peripheral states remain locked within the embrace of their metropole. Placing the Japanese case in historical perspective, and particularly within the context of the spread of industrial capitalism, allows us to explore the context of Japan's struggle to resist Western imperialism while granting an opportunity to understand its unique response to this existential threat. As Hiromi Mizuno suggests: "For non-western nations whose modern national identities were constructed around local cultural logics and mythologies, incorporating modern science into those logics and mythologies posed a problem, even a threat" (2009:2). Gramsci's sensitivity to the importance of the political and cultural milieu of specific social formations allows us to move beyond crude "center-periphery" models and to examine in greater detail social relations within the state. Applying Gramsci's work to the Japanese case can therefore potentially throw new light on how Japanese people incorporated modern science while preserving and, indeed, fashioning anew their sense of a national identity. In addition, applying Gramsci's work can illuminate a familiar yet important subject: the emergence of techno-nationalism as a guiding ideology for Japan, leading eventually to the adoption of nuclear power by the only country ever to have suffered direct nuclear attack. 5 If successful in the Japanese case, this type of analysis might also be undertaken in regard to other East Asian countries pursuing a similar pattern of techno-nationalism (DiMoia 2010) or, in the post -Cold War era, techno-globalism (Nakayama 2012) .
The major thrust of Gramsci's historical materialism of relevance to this article was the result of his attempt to correct perceived difficulties with existing Marxist accounts of the origins and likelihood of social revolution. These accounts, according to Gramsci at least, privileged an analysis of the forces of production (the economic "base") at the expense of an analysis of the social relations of production (the sociopolitical "superstructure"). As a consequence of this imbalance, classical Marxism could account adequately neither for the revolution that took place in relatively "back-ward" Russia nor for its failure to appear in the relatively more "advanced" European economies. The solution, Gramsci suggested, was to examine more closely the complex web of political and cultural relationships through which the legitimacy of the state and its apparatus is maintained.
As is well known, Gramsci rethought a number of familiar concepts as a consequence of his diagnosis of the failures of orthodox Marxism. 6 Perhaps his major contribution was to inquire into the nature of hegemony. Rather than focusing solely on the coercive nature of hegemony that had been such a feature of orthodox Marxist accounts, Gramsci characterized hegemony as a dual process: one of force as a last resort but of consent where possible. In a situation where hegemony prevails, force and consent "balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority" (Gramsci 1971: 80n49) .
Accordingly, ideology plays a key role in Gramscian analysis. The production, transmission, reception, and evolution of ideology are central concerns in his attempt to understand how Italian society was brought together and stayed together despite the deep tensions that threatened to tear it asunder. Gramsci examines the ways and means through which the state, representing a hegemonic bloc of social forces, creates, maintains, and manipulates attitudes and beliefs in civil society in order to secure ongoing consent (implicit and explicit, structured and "spontaneous") to rule. As Renate Holub suggests: "Spontaneous . . . consent is carried by systems and structures of beliefs, values, norms and practices of everyday life which unconsciously legitimate the order of things" (1992: 45).
For Gramsci, civil society is not separate from the state but an integral part of it: state and civil society are coconstituted. Gramsci did at times present his ideas and arguments as though there was a discernible separation between state and civil society, but this was done simply for heuristic purposes. Thus, we find in his work the concept of the "extended state": involving both political society (the state conceived narrowly in its juridical, bureaucratic, and coercive forms) and civil society (the realm of religion, the arts, science, culture, and association). What is more, the lines of force running between state and civil society are bidirectional. In other words, at times it is clear that the state narrowly conceived is in command, while at other times the state modifies its behavior in line with pressure exerted by civil society. The implication of this is that even under conditions of strong hegemony, civil society has a role to play in the ongoing struggle for power and authority.
A historic bloc can be said to have formed when the interests of civil society become indistinguishable from the interests of a hegemonic class. The interests of the hegemonic class are embodied within the "extended" state. The motive force behind this union of state and civil society is a complex web of relationships (economic, social, political, ethical) from which emerges the potential for the formation of a historic bloc. Turning potential into reality demands the coercive and persuasive powers of a hegemonic class, with the state maintaining "cohesion and identity through the propagation of a common culture" (Cox 1996 : 132; on the broad theme, see Crehan 2002) . In the case of postwar Japan the common culture propagated by the state was a mixture of "pacifism" and anticommunism combined with economic growth; it was, in other words, techno-nationalism shorn of its explicit military component. 7 All of this was made possible by the security umbrella provided by the United States, and by US tolerance of Japanese developmental state practices.
The Genesis of Techno-nationalism
If Gramsci is correct, then if we are to revisit the standard narrative of how nuclear power was brought to Japan we should begin not with the important period between the US-led Occupation of Japan (1945 -52) and the Anpo crisis of 1960 but with the currents and events leading up to and beyond the Meiji Restoration of 1868. It was in large part in response to the encroachment of the Western imperial powers that the Meiji oligarchs set Japan on the path of techno-nationalism-a path that led eventually to the adoption of nuclear power.
Two major developments underpin the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji. The first was external to Japan in the form of Western imperialism. The second, related development was internal in the form of a political and economic crisis associated with the long transition from feudalism to capitalism. In combination, these two developments contributed to the unique pattern of social, political, and economic relationships that coalesced within Meiji Japan, as well as to the construction of foundational institutional and ideological structures. The result was one of the most remarkable societal transformations in history. Only the barest outline of a familiar narrative is developed below, since it is the outcome of the process that is most relevant. 8 That outcome is the adoption by the Meiji oligarchs (and their successors) of techno-nationalism as the best available means through which to rapidly "catch up" to the West, economically and militarily. The value of a Gramscian analysis in this case is its emphasis on the lengths to which Japan's leaders had to go to secure the consent of the Japanese public to pursue techno-nationalism in general and adopt nuclear power in particular. Japanese civil society, conceived in the Gramscian sense, has been much more central to the process than is often acknowledged in the literature.
First, political and social rigidity, imposed early in the Tokugawa era, deterred social mobility but could not stifle economic change. Over time, this led to the slow economic decline of the samurai, the rise of both a merchant class and a rural rentier class, and the continued impoverishment of the peasantry. By the time Admiral Perry's "Black Ships" appeared off the coast of Japan in 1853, the tensions engendered by these social and economic inequalities could barely be contained. Resistance to Tokugawa control took the form of interfief rivalry, and peasant protest became commonplace. Divisions existed also within the ranks of the samurai and between the lower 7 The word pacifism is emphasized because of the debate in the literature regarding the question of pacifism in postwar Japan. The debate hinges on the implications of the security umbrella provided by the United States and the peculiar form and understanding of "pacifism" that results. See Bamba and Howes 1978 and Izumikawa 2010. 8 The literature on the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji is vast. A recent Marxist account of this process and its outcomes is Allinson and Anievas 2010 . In what follows I draw upon a number of accounts, primarily Norman 1973 , Westney 1987 , Smith 1988 , and Morris-Suzuki 1994 ranks of the samurai and the nobility. Perry's arrival, and the weak Tokugawa response, triggered the overthrow of the Tokugawa, the "restoration" of the imperial line, and the thorough remaking of the Japanese state and society. Second, the wider context within which these events were situated was dominated by the global spread of industrial capitalism as both a cause and effect of interimperial rivalry (Hobsbawm 1975) . Although it became a signatory to a number of unequal treaties, Japan did not feel the full force of Western imperial power in the crucial early decades of the Meiji era. In Asia, China became the main prize, and its division into spheres of influence occupied the imperial powers at this time. Moreover, this period also saw heavy colonial rivalry and wars in other parts of the globe, drawing attention and resources away from the further exploitation of Japan.
As a consequence, although they did not know it at the time, the Meiji oligarchs and their successors had a certain amount of breathing room in which to accomplish the rapid modernization of Japanese society. They surmised, of course, that they did not have long to strengthen the country sufficiently to level the playing field with the imperial powers, and this partly explains their haste and the methods they employed. After all, nothing "concentrates the mind more than grand opportunity combined with overwhelming danger" (Cumings 1999: 89) . Accordingly, within a relatively short span of time after the imperial restoration, the caste system had been abolished, the feudal landholding system set aside, a land tax instituted, a system of compulsory education initiated, and a conscript army raised. The machinery of government had been overhauled a number of times, and by 1889 the emperor had gifted to his subjects a written constitution. In short, by the turn of the century, there was now a recognizably national Japanese economy resting upon a solid institutional and regulatory foundation. Key characteristics of the economy were a growing physical infrastructure, a solid tax base, increasing private ownership of financial and productive capital, close relationships between private business and the bureaucracy, an emerging focus on heavy industry and arms production, and a largely compliant, well-educated workforce (Johnson 1982; Freeman 1987) . By 1902, the year in which the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded, the Japanese state was centralized, powerful, and yet answerable, to a limited extent, to the voice of its people (Berry 1998) .
Despite the limited form of democratic accountability encapsulated within the Meiji Constitution, the Meiji Restoration (and the subsequent rapid modernization of Japan) was planned and shaped largely without the direct input of the majority of the Japanese population. It was "a revolution carried out by dissident elements of the old ruling class: a revolution from above, not below" (Stockwin 1999: 15) . Gramsci (1971: 106-20) captures moments of "revolution without a revolution" through the concept of passive revolution, indicating, in this particular case, a political strategy wherein a relatively small group of individuals institutes incremental yet far-reaching social change. To a certain extent, the Meiji oligarchs and their successors could rely on the coercive tools available to any state (the bureaucracy, judiciary, police, and military) in their quest for modernization, and in this they remained true to form. However, as Gramsci reminds us, hegemony requires leadership rather than domination. Thus, despite the limited democratic franchise, and in the absence of a deeply rooted democratic tradition, civil society remained important. The state was-to a limited extent-able to mold the minds of Japanese people (Garon 1997) , but some of the channels it developed in order to achieve this (outlined below) worked both ways, such that "many of the new social forces entered into rather intimate relations with the state" (Garon 2003: 56) .
Successive Japanese governments sought actively to channel the imagination and the energies of the Japanese people in directions best suited to their needs. Foremost among these channels were the pursuit of economic modernization and imperialism. The river into which these channels jointly spilled was techno-nationalism, manifesting through the pursuit of rapid industrialization and technological advancement and underpinned by social control (Gao 1997; Low 2005) . Emperor Meiji played a crucial role. Official documents issued in his name, such as the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882) and the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), as well as the constitution itself, set an unquestionable ideological stamp on government policy. The sentiments contained within these official documents were bolstered by a long tradition of clarion calls to "revere the emperor, expel the barbarian," to pursue "civilization and enlightenment," and, of course, to build Japan into a "rich nation, strong army." In addition, a rich tapestry of state-led or -dominated associations, such as the Patriotic Women's Association (founded in 1901), the Local Improvement Campaign (1908) , and the Imperial Military Reserve Association (1910), delivered the same message to the grass roots of Japanese society-a message that only intensified during the 1920s and 1930s as Japan entered the period of militarism and ultranationalism.
Techno-nationalism and the Political Economy of Nuclear Power
The previous section sketched the genesis of techno-nationalism in Japan from the mid-nineteenth century onward and the major channels through which its animating force was diffused throughout Japanese society. It emphasized the centrality of the ideology of techno-nationalism and its role in securing the consent of the Japanese people to rapid industrialization and imperialism. Techno-nationalism acted as the glue binding political society and civil society through the shared aim of ensuring national sovereignty by catching up with the West. Techno-nationalism was not simply forced upon the Japanese people by a remote and brutalizing elite; it was also "sold" to them as a path to both individual and collective self-determination. Techno-nationalism required putting the state before the individual, putting production before consumption, and putting nationalism before democracy. The aim of this section is to establish how and why these elements were reconfigured in the postwar era so that the adoption of nuclear power became possible.
What follows, therefore, is a stylized historical account of the 1945 -60 period, during which Japanese society consented-for the most part-to the introduction of nuclear power. This sketch emphasizes a number of the key factors involved: the hegemony of the United States and its shaping of a new world order, the "domestic" political economy of nuclear power, and the social struggle over nuclear power in Japan, which was shaped significantly by the US propaganda campaign designed to secure global and Japanese acceptance of the "peaceful" atom.
US Hegemony and World Order
The concept of world order deployed here embraces a notion of a multiplicity of actors and values operating at all levels from localities to civilizations (O'Hagan 2002) . World order is a manifestation of global hegemony and takes the form of an economic, political, and social structure that shapes behavior in ways that support and entrench the dominant mode of production (Cox 1996) . In absolute terms, the United States possessed enormous economic and military power in the early postwar period. In accordance with a neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony-as a form of power rooted in society and involving both coercion and persuasion-the United States used this power to shape the actions of allies and enemies alike in accord with US interests (Cox 1987; Rupert 1995) . US interests were encapsulated within the commitment to defend liberal democracy and capitalism and were driven by the sense of danger inspired by the menace of communism at home and abroad (Osgood 2006) .
In relative terms, however, US hegemony was partial and limited, constrained as it was by competition with the Soviet Union (Kolko and Kolko 1972) . Nevertheless, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and of Nagasaki on 9 August can be represented as an early assertion of US hegemony. The bombings set the stage for the Cold War and its accompanying arms race (Sherwin 2005) . They also spelled the end of the Japanese empire and the destruction of much of the Japanese economy (Dower 1999) . As the Cold War began to unfold, however, Japan's identity was transformed. US planners now saw Japan not as a defeated enemy to be kept in permanent submission but as a junior member of the US-led alliance against communism and an emerging capitalist economy and liberal democratic polity (Schaller 1985; Welfield 1988; Swenson-Wright 2005) . Accordingly, from early 1948, Japan's role was to act as a forward base of operations for the US military, including its atomic arsenal. Japan was also to act as a symbol of the benefits of capitalism and as a beacon of democracy in communist Asia.
The Political Economy of Nuclearization
There never was a single, unified movement in favor of nuclear power in Japan. On the contrary, a mixed bag of politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, scientists, and representatives of the mass media offered a variety of positions, proposals, and pleas both in favor of and-less often-against the development of a nuclear industry in Japan. Moreover, even those in favor of nuclear power often differed widely in their visions of its realization. To these voices were added calls from like-minded interests in the United States, seeking gain through commercial and political connections with Japanese firms and the Japanese government (Medhurst 1997) . The result was a divided industry-what Hitoshi Yoshioka (2005a) calls a "bipolar structure"-characterized, on the one hand, by an alliance between the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the electric power utility companies (focused upon importing and indigenizing reactor technology) and, on the other, by a group headed by the Science and Technology Agency (focused upon the independent development of reactor technology, including "fast breeder" reactors supposedly able to produce more nuclear fuel than they consume). Japan's postwar involvement with nuclear power arguably began on 3 March 1954, three months after Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech (8 December 1953) to the United Nations. 9 This involvement began when an amendment to the Japanese budget was proposed, including 300 million yen for the promotion of science and technology. The budget was approved one month later, on 3 April 1954. Of the total, 260 million yen were allocated to nuclear science and technology: 235 million yen to the construction of a nuclear reactor, 15 million yen for uranium exploration, and 10 million yen for the procurement of research materials. The amendment was formulated by the Reformation Party but was proposed jointly with the Liberal Party and the Japan Liberal Party (Yoshioka 2005b) . Although he was far from alone in his endeavors, Nakasone Yasuhiro claimed responsibility for this surprise move. Nakasone and his fellow sponsors stole a march on Japan's scientific community, which was embroiled in a debate less about the wisdom of nuclear research and development and more about the circumstances under which it should be conducted and the uses to which it might be put, that is, democratic control and peaceful use (Yoshioka 2005b) . Much later in his career, Nakasone declared that witnessing the rising atomic cloud from a vantage point on the island of Shikoku "lit a fire within me to develop atomic energy" (Low 2005: 40) . Yoshioka (2005b: 109) dates Nakasone's interest in nuclear power from 1951, but what is not at issue is that Nakasone became an unstinting advocate for nuclear power (explicitly of commercial nuclear power but implicitly not excluding a role for nuclear weapons) for the rest of his career. This career included stints as the minister for science, head of the Defense Agency, and minister for international trade and industry, and as prime minister between 1982 and 1987.
Other powerful "veto" players (Hymans 2011) , including Shōriki Matsutarō, a one-time police officer and later proprietor of the popular newspaper Yomiuri, joined Nakasone in his advocacy of nuclear power. Unlike Nakasone, however, who preferred that government should take the lead, Shōriki supported a leading role for business in the development of a Japanese nuclear industry. Shōriki fought hard to secure this goal and was influential in founding the Council for the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in April 1955. In 1956 he launched the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum and became chair of the Atomic Energy Commission and head of the Science and Technology Agency. 10 From the very start, members of Japan's postwar hegemonic class such as Nakasone and Shōriki attempted to script separate narratives for civilian and military nuclear power. As part of the Yoshida Doctrine of rapid economic growth, low military expenditure, and protection within the US alliance system, the strategy used by Japan's leaders relied on nuclear weapons for the common defense, but they denied that such weapons had ever been brought into Japan's sovereign space-despite entering into secret agreements allowing their introduction (Swenson-Wright 2005; Yamazaki 2009 ). In addition, Japan's hegemonic class sought to erode the effectiveness of the antinuclear movement through the development of the metaphor of the "nuclear allergy"-insisting that those who opposed the development of commercial nuclear power were either mentally ill or ignorant of the benefits of the technology, or both (Hook 1996) . Over time, successive governments also adopted informal limits on the development and introduction of nuclear weapons and on defense spending more generally. Many of these informal limits had found earlier expression in the Nuclear Energy Charter drafted at the behest of the Japan Science Council following the "nuclear budget" of 1954 (Yoshioka 2005b) . Finally, members of Japan's postwar hegemonic class used their influence to lobby in favor of the development of an ostensibly civilian-controlled, democratically accountable, commercial nuclear industry. Politicians, businessmen, scientists, and representatives of the media declared the wisdom and necessity of commercial nuclearization, both within the Diet and among the general populace (Yanaga 1968; Samuels 1987; Yoshioka 2005a ). According to their arguments, commercial nuclear reactors would both embody and fuel the technological advancement and industrial restructuring necessary to maintain rising national income and living standards (Hein 1993) .
These arguments clearly resonated with a Japanese populace beginning to enjoy the benefits of postwar recovery. Increasing acceptance of nuclear power used for peaceful purposes sat comfortably within a prevailing and deep-rooted ideology of technonationalism. Shorn of its explicit military associations, techno-nationalism appeared to be delivering on another promise: the possibility of mass consumption. The aspirations of Japan's urban dwellers in particular were whetted by the advertisements they saw on the trains they took to work, by the weekly magazines and comics they read, by the goods on display in department stores, and by the advertising and movies they watched at the cinema. 11 It is in these everyday practices that we see "spontaneous" consent to nuclear power.
Following the introduction of television to Japan in 1953, audiences were entranced by the lifestyles they were exposed to through that medium. In the absence of much domestic content, popular US shows such as I Love Lucy and Father Knows Best became firm favorites. These shows portrayed a "middle mass" lifestyle characterized by the enjoyment of consumer goods (particularly labor-saving devices such as washing machines, sewing machines, refrigerators, and vacuum cleaners) and by behavioral patterns and relational norms (leisure, personal freedom, and equality) associated with possession of those goods (Ivy 1993) . This "education in the possibilities of consumption" (Francks 2009: 160) was very deliberate. Television broadcasting was commercially unviable at the time, simply because most ordinary Japanese consumers could not afford to own a television set. Indeed, a great many of them, particularly outside the urban centers, would not have been able to buy the products they saw advertised upon it. 12 Television was brought to Japan nevertheless, because men like Shoriki Matsutaro saw it primarily as a means to attain influence and power, rather than as a source of profit. 13 A more important consideration for Shoriki and his American patrons "was the power of television as a weapon against communism" (Partner 2000: 105) . 11 Japan's urban population tripled in size between 1945 and 1970 (Francks 2009 . 12 In 1955, 166,000 televisions were either in use or licensed in Japan; by 1960 there were almost 7 million. The corresponding figures for West Germany were 2,000 and 4.5 million (Tipton 2002: 158) . 13 It was not until the end of the 1960s that almost all Japanese households possessed the "three sacred treasures" (black-and-white television, washing machine, and refrigerator) (Francks 2009: 175, 230). However, despite all the pressures and inducements, ordinary Japanese people had deep-seated reasons for associating nuclear technology with death and destruction, and many of them had their concerns confirmed after the veil of ignorance imposed by US censorship began to lift from 1952 onward (Wittner 1993; Hook 1996) . The antiSecurity Treaty demonstrations in 1960 were molded and directed by left-leaning political parties and the trade unions, for the most part, but also through religious organizations and the print media, as well as through wide-ranging debate in the scientific community (Nakayama 2005) . Christians and socialists dominated Japan's nascent peace movement, developing similar strategies and international links, and the Japanese Socialist Party campaigned on a platform of antimilitarism and permanent neutrality (Wittner 1993; Bamba and Howse 1978) . Opposition fused around the US-Japan alliance and around the plight of the hibakusha (atomic-bomb-affected persons). The hibakusha drew attention both to their immediate circumstances (the refusal of the Japanese government to compensate them for their suffering, and the lack of medical treatment) and to the wider implications of nuclear power and radioactive contamination. The hibakusha kept the issue before the eyes of a global audience through a series of rallies and were successful in establishing 6 August as World Peace Day and in having Hiroshima named as a Peace Memorial City.
Armed with the knowledge of the atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, public perceptions of nuclear weapons were almost entirely negative (see Hook 1996: chap. 5). These perceptions were strengthened by the uncertainty surrounding the US nuclear strategy in the early Cold War. The successful testing of a Soviet atom bomb, on 29 August 1949, ignited fears of a nuclear conflict if the USSR were to intervene on behalf of the People's Republic of China under the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. These fears were magnified during the Korean War and again when it was discovered that the United States had tested its first thermonuclear device. Finally, perceptions became reality on 1 March 1954, when Japan suffered its "third nuclear attack"-the Castle Bravo test (Divine 1978) .
As is now well known, as a consequence of the Castle Bravo test at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands, a Japanese fishing vessel, the Lucky Dragon No. 5 (Daigo Fukuryu-maru), was caught in the radioactive fallout. 14 On its return to Japan, on 14 March, almost the entire crew of the vessel were suffering headaches, nausea, and diarrhea as a consequence of radiation exposure. What is less widely known is that a large number of fishing vessels were irradiated throughout the entire period of bomb testing in the Pacific. Yukuo Sasamoto reports that between March and the end of August 1954, ninety-six "other fishing vessels were identified as having been directly affected by the 'ashes of death' produced by the series of US hydrogen bomb experiments around Bikini Atoll from March to May 1954 May " (2005 .
The Bikini incident, the death of the Lucky Dragon No. 5's radio officer on 23 September, and the hospitalization of the twenty-two remaining crew members proved a major spur to the antinuclear movement. Radioactive fallout, the "ashes of death," bridged the gap between commercial nuclear power and nuclear weapons, blunting the efforts of those desperate to establish a single narrative of the "friendly atom." A national petition against nuclear weapons gathered approximately 32 million signa-tures-more than half of Japan's registered voters (Hook 1996: 171; Jones 2010: 181-98) . The city of Yaizu, the home port of the Lucky Dragon, passed a resolution calling for a ban on all military use of nuclear energy, a call echoed by other local governments, as well as both houses of the Diet. Nagasaki's International Cultural Hall and Hiroshima's Peace Memorial Museum attracted more than 330,000 visitors between them in 1955, and that same year Hiroshima hosted the First World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) was formed in September 1955 and would go on to become one of Japan's most important mass movements.
US Propaganda and the Triumph of the "Friendly Atom"
The decisive element in securing Japanese consent to nuclearization was American power. Without support from the United States, nuclear power may never have been an option for Japan at all, given that the United States supplied the enriched uranium, the technological and engineering know-how and training, and the financial capital required to lay Japan's nuclear foundations. In the event, Eisenhower's speech to the United Nations on 8 December 1953 launched the Atoms for Peace campaign and, in so doing, helped to steer Japan down the path of nuclear power. Outwardly an attempt by the United States to encourage the peaceful use and diffusion of atomic energy through the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the campaign was also a veiled attempt to maintain the extant technology gap between the United States and potential new entrants by exposing them to a regime of monitoring and surveillance. In addition, by "demonstrating the ability to bring 'rapid, cultural, economic and social improvements through the application of power reactors,' the United States would offer progress through the ingenuity of American capitalism" (Osgood 2006: 169) . This was what motivated US offers to supply Japan with nuclear technology and enriched uranium, a process that culminated in the signing of the US-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement on 14 November 1955.
Overseen by the Operations Coordinating Board, the Atoms for Peace initiative had the full weight of the US government behind it. 15 The US Information Agency (USIA), created in August 1953, distributed Eisenhower's speech throughout the globe. The USIA distributed in excess of 16 million posters and booklets advertising the speech through its 217 overseas posts, and the Voice of America broadcast it live to thirty-five countries. Leading newspapers in twenty-five countries published the speech in full. The USIA worked closely with American firms and nongovernmental organizations throughout the world, overseeing the distribution of approximately 400,000 leaflets. Westinghouse Electric Company, a firm with plans to supply atomic power to Japan, attached a cover note of its own to the 35,000 leaflets it distributed to business executives, engineers, and opinion leaders in more than 125 countries. As Kenneth Osgood makes clear, the effort to publicize Atoms for Peace "was a global one, linking public and private resources in a total campaign to sell Eisenhower's plan to the world" (2006:166) .
In the wake of the damaging publicity surrounding the irradiation of the Lucky Dragon No. 5, the USIA placed greater weight on the peaceful application of nuclear technology. A series of television programs titled The Magic of the Atom went into production. Each episode focused on a particular aspect: "Power Unlimited," "The Atom and Agriculture," "The Atom and Industry," "The Atomic City," and so forth. The USIA created traveling exhibits and dispatched them to major cities in Europe, Africa, and Asia. These exhibits were designed to replace the fearsome image of the mushroom cloud, so dominant in the public imagination, with peaceful images of medical and biochemical research, industrial and agricultural production, and electrical power generation. They featured working models of Geiger counters and workers interacting safely with nuclear materials and machinery. They also featured illustrations of nuclear power plants and the process of power generation and colorful displays depicting the "friendly atom" at work. All of the exhibits showed a film produced by General Electric called A Is for Atom. The film presented the basic physics of atomic power and its peaceful application-using simple language and visuals comprehensible to the lay viewer. The implicit message throughout was that nuclear power was safe, cheap, innovative, liberating, and, above all, American.
Following a Shinto purification ceremony on its arrival in November 1955, the Japan exhibition spent six weeks in Tokyo before showing in six other Japanese cities. The Kyoto exhibit alone received over 150,000 visitors (Osgood 2006: 176) . The one millionth Japanese visitor toured the exhibition while it was housed in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum-despite the furor caused by the removal of atom bomb exhibits to create sufficient space (Zwigenberg 2012) . Cosponsored, on the one hand, by Shōriki Matsutarō (via the Yomiuri) and other Japanese businesses and, on the other, by the US government, the exhibition resonated strongly with the Japanese public. The wide range of practical applications of nuclear power apparently left visiting scientists stunned. Schoolchildren marveled at the nuclear-powered ships, trains, and airplanes. The fashionably dressed exhibition guides reportedly impressed the female audience almost as much as the array of new household devices on display (Zwigenberg 2012) .
Despite the enchantment of these exhibitions, antinuclear protests continued as a feature of the Japanese social landscape for some years. There is little question, however, that the Atoms for Peace exhibitions constituted a significant milestone on Japan's path toward nuclear power. The exhibitions, and the wider propaganda campaign of which they were a part, successfully made the argument that the commercial exploitation of nuclear technology was both feasible and desirable. In the Japanese case in particular, advocates of nuclear power tapped into a deeply rooted acceptance of techno-nationalism: an ideology made safe through its disassociation from military power and authoritarian rule, on one hand, and from nuclear weapons, on the other.
Conclusion
Upon a foundation provided by the historical materialism of Antonio Gramsci, this article has revisited a historical narrative no doubt familiar to many readers of this journal. A Gramscian interpretation negates neither the importance of the domestic debate and struggle over nuclear power that took place in Japan in the 1950s nor the centrality of American power and its creation of a new world order post-1945. However, the article argues that the origins of nuclear power in Japan lie not solely within the domestic sphere. Nor do they lie solely in the machinations of American and Japanese elites inside and outside of government. Power, money, and institutions were obviously key elements but, on their own, cannot tell the whole story.
Without neglecting the aforementioned variables, a Gramscian analysis draws the analytical gaze both further back in time and toward the key roles played by ideology and civil society. For this reason the narrative begins in the mid-nineteenth century and with elite perceptions of Japanese inferiority relative to the encroaching Western imperial powers. Their reaction to the vulnerability engendered by Western imperialism was to seek to "catch up" to the West in economic and military terms as rapidly as possible, given the circumstances in which they found themselves. In order to achieve this, they swept away the ancien régime and replaced it with an authoritarian yet recognizably modern bureaucratic state. In order to gain the consent of the bulk of the Japanese people to the pursuit of techno-nationalism, and to the sacrifices it entailed, successive governments conjured visions of future prosperity and national autonomy. Thus, at various times, Japanese people were exhorted to embrace "civilization and enlightenment" and to make Japan into a "rich nation, strong army."
The consequences of Japan's techno-nationalism are well known. Radical nationalism underpinned by a cult of "emperor worship" drove Japan toward imperialism abroad and authoritarianism and militarism at home. Ultimately, Japan confronted an enemy far stronger and more technically advanced than itself, and the tragedy of the atomic bombings was the result. These experiences, coupled with the US-led Occupation and the exigencies of the emerging Cold War, served not to destroy Japan's pursuit of techno-nationalism but to confirm and transform it. Shorn of its explicit military component, techno-nationalism was more mundane but that much safer. In place of a "rich nation, strong army" there now stood an "income-doubling plan." This future Japan was portrayed as a country at peace with itself and its neighbors, a sovereign yet "pacifist" state, a place of opportunity, personal prosperity, and, above all, steadily rising consumption.
Advocates of nuclear power offered all of these visions and more. Despite having often competing priorities and strategies, nuclear advocates brought their considerable resources and skills to bear on a Japanese population familiar with the aims of technonationalism yet concerned about the dangers of nuclear weapons and radioactive fallout. Ordinary Japanese people consented to nuclear power as a result of a fear of the emerging "communist threat," combined with a desire to embrace the transformative possibilities offered by commercial nuclear power. In its turn, the Japanese state set limits on remilitarization and sought to minimize its association with nuclear weapons as far as practicably possible.
In the post-Fukushima world, Japanese people appear-for the moment, at leastfar less likely to be swayed by nuclear advocacy. And yet it seems unlikely that Japan will divest itself of nuclear power for the foreseeable future. Quite apart from the physical challenges associated with tearing down and safely disposing of the very considerable nuclear infrastructure and its waste products, Japan still needs a steady and reliable supply of energy. Moreover, Japan faces a difficult strategic situation in its region, where nuclear weapons are in abundance. Finally, the "nuclear village" is extremely powerful and deeply entrenched within Japanese society. Removing it, or even bypassing it, would be a difficult task for any government no matter how much backing it received from civil society. Nevertheless, as Gramsci suggests, ideology plays a huge yet often overlooked role. Techno-nationalism lives on in Japan despite Fukushima, and therein may lie the beginnings of its postnuclear future, one where new materials and new sources of power hold sway and where different ways of living in the world seem not only desirable but possible.
